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ABSIRACf 
An emerging global phenomenon is the application of biotechnology to food and 
agricultural production. How individual firms will relate to biotechnological advances 
and the decisions made regarding the commercialization ofbiotechnologywill influence 
the structure of the industrial landscape in global markets and international trade. The 
scope of biotechnology in the United States and Europe and the economic incentives 
for transnational vertical integration of biotechnological products or processes is 
examined. An economic model is used to assess the nature of incentives for the 
transnational vertical integration of biotechnology. The analysis argues that rights to 
commercial biotechnology products or processes are intangible assets which may 
provide incentives for vertical foreign direct investment by the firms holding such 
rights. The transnational character of intellectual property as an intangible asset is 
explored briefly. Implications are drawn from the analysis concerning transnational 
vertical integration of biotechnology. 
I.A BIOTECHNOLOGIE AGRICOLE COMME UN BIEN INTANGffiLE: 
STIMUlANTS POUR L'INTEGRATION VERTICALE INTERNATIONALE DES 
ENTREPRISES AGRICOLES. 
L'utilisation de la biotechnologie dans la production agricole et alimentaire est 
un phenomene globale recent. L'adoption des decouvertes biotechnologiques par les 
entreprises et les decisions de commercialisation de cette nouvelle technologie vont 
influencer le marcbe mondial et le commerce international. L' etendue de la 
biotechnologie aux Etats-Unis et en Europe, et les stimulants economiques pour 
I' integration verticale internationale des produits et des procedes biotechnologiques sont 
examines. Un modele economique est utilise pour evaluer la nature des stimulants a 
!'integration verticale internationale de Ia biotechnologie. L'analyse prouve que les 
droits sur les produits et les procedes commerciaux biotechnologiques sont des biens 
intangibles qui peuvent encourager l'investivement direct vertical par les entreprises 
etrangeres qui detiennent ses droits. Le caractere international des proprietes 
intellectuelles comme biens intangibles est discute brievement. Des implications sont 
deduites de !'analyse de !'integration verticale intemationale de la ·biotechnologie. 
L Introduction 
An emerging global phenomenon is the application of biotechnology to food and 
agricultural production. Understanding the economic forces which shape how 
biotechnological advances are commercialized will be increasingly important over the 
ensuing decade. Clearly, basic scientific knowledge in biology knows no geographic 
boundaries. Yet, if the consequences of basic scientific advance are to enhance the 
quality of life, these advances must result in commercial products and processes. How 
industries and individual firms in the developed world, especially agribusinesses, will 
relate to biotechnological advances and the decisions made regarding the 
commercialization of biotechnology will influence the structure of the industrial 
landscape in global markets and international trade. 
This paper examines the scope of biotechnology in the United States and 
Europe and the economic incentives for transnational vertical integration by businesses 
which have proprietary rights to commercial biotechnological products or processes. 
A rather simple economic model is used to assess the nature of incentives for the 
transnational vertical integration of biotechnology. Rights to commercial biotechnology 
products or processes are held to be firm-specific intangible assets which may provide 
incentives for foreign direct investment (FDI) by the firms holding such rights. Some 
definition and description of biotechnology is beneficial in comprehending the scope 
of global biotechnology. In addition, the transnational character of intellectual 
property as an intangible asset is explored briefly. Finally, an economic model is 
examined which provides insight into potential incentives for the transnational vertical 
integration by biotechnology firms. 
2 Scope of Biotechnology in the U.S. and Europe 
For purposes of this paper, biotechnology is defined as the industrial use of 
rDNA, cell fusion, and novel bioprocessing techniques. A broader definition 
sometimes is used by analysts which includes any technique that employs living 
organisms to make or modify products, or to develop micro-organisms for specific uses,. 
as biotechnology. The former definition is used here and is consistent with the 
conventional notion of biotechnology in most scientific literature. 
The potential financial reward to firms for new products or processes based on 
biotechnology is substantial. Recent estimates indicate that United States (U.S.) 
agricultural biotechnology revenues may expand from a modest $60 million in 1988 to 
over $1.6 billion annually by 1998, Figure 1. The data in Figure 1 indicate a compound 
annual growth rate of nearly 50 percent between 1991 and 1998. 
Forecasts of global markets for agricultural biotechnology are equally 
impressive. By 2000 the size of the global market for applications of biotechnology to 
agriculture may exceed $10 billion, Figure 2. The largest market segment within the 
total global market is expected to be pharmaceutical production at $4 billion annually. 
Other significant market sectors are expected to be transgenic plants, animal health 
products, and microbial pesticides. 
Typically firms engaging in biotechnology research and development are 
categorized as start-up companies dedicated to biotechnological products, called 
dedicated biotechnology companies (DBCs), and major corporations with significant 
investment in biotechnology. DBCs are mostly a U.S. phenomenon and funded initially 
by venture capital. In 1988, the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congre~ 
verified that there were 403 DBCs in existence and over 70 major corporations with 
significant investment in biotechnology (OTA, 1991, p. 5). However, the largest DBC 
in the U.S. is Genentech which was acquired in the late 1980s by Swiss-owned 
Hoffman-LaRoche. 
Europe is a substantial player in global biotechnology. Information on 
European activities presented here is drawn largely from a 1991 OTA report. This 
report indicates that in Denmark, industrial biotechnology efforts are made primarily 
by well-established pharmaceutical firms and that over 90 percent of all production is 
exported. Denmark, however, has relatively little activity in food. 
Germany is a biotechnology leader within Europe. Major firms include Bayer, 
BASF, Hoechst, Boehringer Ingelheim, and Boehringer Mannheim. There are 
approximately 40 DBCs. German firms have been particularly aggressive in licensing 
agreements and acquisitions involving U.S. firms. For example, BASF recently 
acquired U.S.-based Inmont (OTA, 1991, p. 234). 
France has over 700 firms engaged in some form of biotechnology. OTA 
estimates that about 100 of these play a major active role in research and development. 
By comparison, the Netherlands has 4 large firms engaged in commercial 
biotechnology (AKZO, DSM, Shell, and Unilever) and about 34 DBCs. The Dutch 
firms tend to concentrate on the food and dairy sectors. 
There are approximately 40 firms in Sweden engaged in biotechnology and these 
firms are quite active internationally. The strengths of Sweden's firms tends to be in 
fermentation, carbohydrate-based substances, and pharmaceuticals. 
The United Kingdom has nearly 300 firms involved in biotechnology research 
and development, but only about 40 of these firms are leaders in biotechnology. These 
firms are primarily engaged in genetic engineering or monoclonal antibody engineering. 
3. Intellectual Property Rights As lntangJ."ble Assets 
Innovation in biotechnology leads to the creation of intellectual property. 
Modem intellectual property law includes several areas of law: patent, copyright, 
trademark, trade secret, and breeders' rights (OTA, 1990, p. 4). Patents, trade secrets, 
and plant variety protection laws are particularly important to biotechnology. 
Trademarks are expected to become increasingly important as biotechnology products 
become commercialized. 
Patents provide financial incentives to inventors by granting an exclusive right 
to the inventor for a period of time (17 years in the U.S.). There are international 
agreements which protect biological inventions. These include the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Budapest 
Treaty, the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), 
and the European Patent Convention (EPC). There are 19 member nations as part 
of UPOV and 14 countries are part of EPC (OTA, 1991, p. 208). These agreements 
provide significant legal protection for inventions created through the use of 
biotechnology. 
Some difficulties prevail in transnational intellectual property right protection. 
The issue of what constitutes patentable micro-organisms, plants, and animals has 
become more arduous because of evolving legal treatment in the U.S. The EPC, in 
Article 52(1), defines patentable subject matter broadly as "inventions which are 
susceptible of industrial application, which are new, and which involve an inventive 
step" (OTA, 1990, p. 160). This definition is ambiguous in ascertaining when a process 
is "essentially biological," a critical criterion for determining biotechnology patentability. 
Currently, key to a process being deemed "essentially biological" is the extent of 
technical human intervention in the process. If human intervention plays a major role 
in determining or controlling the desired result then the process is patentable. Thus, 
EPC does not protect essentially biological processes or specific plant varieties 
produced either by breeding or genetic manipulation. However, EPC does not exclude 
microbiological inventions from patentability. 
Certainly some differences do exist among major developed nations in their 
treatment of intellectual property. International agreements regarding the patentability 
of animals do not exist, even though U.S. law has evolved to the point where the 
Patent and Trademark Office issued a 1987 policy statement which indicates 
"nonnaturally occurring nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including animals, to 
be patentable subject matter" (OTA, 1990, p. 93). On balance however, biotechnology 
patents, trade secrets, and the plant variety protection laws assist in creating firm-
specific intangt"ble assets and these intangible assets tend to be recognized on a global 
basis. Nevertheless, currently there is more risk on a global basis in intellectual 
property right protection of transgenic animals. 
4. The Calgene Tomato: A Case Rumple 
Enhanced vertical marketing ties appear inevitable for some new 
biotechnologically-based food products. The Calgene Corporation, a U.S.-based DBC, 
in 1993 is expected to commercially market the first genetically-engineered tomato for 
the fresh market. The tomato has an extended shelf-life of 7 to 10 days compared to 
conventional tomatoes. It will be marketed under the brand name FLA. VR SA VR and 
the company anticipates tight vertical control over the entire production and 
distribution of the tomato. The company has no previous experience in distributing or 
marketing food products. 
Calgene intends on contracting with producers to have the tomato grown under 
rigid cultural practice specifications. Growers will not be "producers" in the traditional 
sense since they will never own the crop they cultivate. The company will provide for 
the national distn"bution of the tomatoes into retail food stores. Longer-term plans call 
for transnational licensing of the technology. The Calgene tomato is an early 
indication of the tighter vertical relationships that are likely to accompany new 
bioengineered food products. The dilemma is to understand the economic factors 
which lead to these anticipated tighter vertical ties and understand their consequences. 
S. Alternative Vertical I jnkages 
Viewed broadly as a continuum, alternative vertical linkages in agricultural 
commodity marketing channels range from no explicit vertical tie, i.e. sale of products 
or procurement of inputs with simple open or spot market transactions, through 
contractual arrangements of various forms, and ultimately to vertical ownership 
integration. Understanding the motivations for managerial choice among these 
alternative exchange arrangements is challenging. 
Using transaction cost logic, Sporleder has argued that asset specificity may be 
viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for vertical integration (Sporleder, 
1992). Cost control typically is effective when relying on open market product sale or 
input procurement. Managerial choice of contracts as a vertical linkage is constrained 
by bounded rationality. Ownership integration is discouraged as a vertical linkage 
through relatively high idiosyncratic investment from ubiquitous asset specificity. 
However, lessened holdup possibilities exist when firms rely on ownership integration. 
In essence, managerial choice may be motivated by a desire to balance between the 
weaker cost control of ownership integration with diminished quasirent exploitation 
potential. Strategic alliances, or extente cordiale, as a relatively new vertical linkage, 
may be viewed as the choice of managers when attempting to vertically optimize 
among control, bounded rationality, and idiosyncratic investment. The role of 
intangible assets and the motivation for firms to engage in vertical FDI is not explained 
by these notions however. 
Several types of horizontal and/ or vertical contractual linkages are prevalent 
among biotechnology firms. A recent Ernst & Young survey identified equity-based 
agreements, agreements to further manufacturing, research agreements, marketing 
agreements, and technology licensing agreements (Burrill, 1990, pp. 66-67). The 
equity-based agreements usually provide for a minority equity position in a 
biotechnology company to a major corporation. The major corporation then becomes 
a collaborator in R&D to develop one or more of the biotechnology firm's products 
or processes. An agreement for further processing extends the manufacturing 
capability of the biotechnology firm, either in-house or on a customized manufacturing 
basis by a collaborator firm, in return for a share of the profits to the collaborating 
firm. The research agreement is to facilitate continued R&D of a process or product 
where the collaborating firm supplies funds in exchange for a share of the profits. 
Agreements involving marketing augment the biotechnology firm's capacity in 
marketing a commercial product, where the collaborating firm provides expertise, a 
marketing network and/ or distributors to market the product or process in exchange 
for a share of profits. licensing agreements transfer the rights to use a technology to 
a collaborating firm interested in commercialization of the product or process. 
licensing agreements do not necessarily indicate a continuing interaction between the 
biotechnology firm and the licensee but such continuity is common. 
6. Some Evidence on lntangt"ble Assets 
lntangtble assets are a vital portion of total assets of many large firms, including 
those engaged in biotechnology. Intangible assets as a percent of total assets tends to 
be highly variable among major firms. For example, Monsanto and Eli Lilly, two major 
U.S.-based corporations, reported 1991 intangible assets at 20.7 percent and 15.7 
percent of total assets, respectively, Table 1. Calgene, a U.S. DBC, reported intangtble 
assets at 17.7 percent of total assets for the same year. However, Cell tech of the U.K. 
and Hoechst Ag of Germany reported intangible assets at zero percent and 0.4 percent 
of total assets, respectively, for 1989. Because of the lack of international accountancy 
standards for intangible assets, however, these comparisons may be data artifacts and 
thus of little analytical insight. 
The composite balance sheet for all U.S.-based biotechnology firms, published 
by the Ernst & Young High Technology Group, reveals intangible assets of about 11 
percent of total assets for 1989 (Burrill, 1990, pp. 120-121). Only about 1 percent of 
total assets of firms represented by the composite balance sheet were reported in 
patents, an additional 1 percent in investments in partnerships, with another 4 percent 
in goodwill and other intangibles. The composite balance sheet is compiled by the 
Ernst & Young Group for all biotechnology firms, not just those engaged in 
agricultural or food biotechnology. 
7. lntangJ."ble Assets and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
There are three leading hypotheses concerning the determinants of FDI 
although only one tends to be supported by existing empirical evidence (Grubaugh, 
1987a). One hypothesis is that firms become international and engage in FDI as a 
matter of capital arbitrage. A second hypothesis is that oligopolist firms simply chose 
to compete with their rivals by producing in various countries. The third hypothesis 
is that vertical integration is encouraged when firms possess intangible assets. 
Connor captures the essence of firm-specific intangibles by representing them 
to include " ... patents, trademarks, consumer loyalty to its brands, a positive enterprise 
image, research and development (R&D) resources yielding technological leadership, 
effective data gathering and information systems, special relationships with sources of 
financial capital, and so on" (Connor, 1983, p. 398). Clearly, several of these 
characteristics are associated with biotechnology, e.g. R&D that yields technologica1 
leadership, patents, and/or trademarks. 
The role of such intangible assets is at the core of most of the empirica1 
evidence regarding incentives for firms to invest in foreign operations; the larger a 
firm's intangibles, the greater its foreign investment (Casson, 1987; Caves, 1974~ 
Connor, 1983; Grimwade, 1989; Grubaugh 1987a and 1987b; Gruber, Mehta an~ 
Vernon, 1967; Handy and Henderson, 1992; Helpman, 1984; Meredith, 1984). Mos1 
of the empirical investigations of the relationship between intangible assets and FDI 
however, do not distinguish between horizontal and vertical investments. Thus, the) 
offer scant insight into whether international investments by biotechnology firms wil 
be vertical. Therefore, industrial organization and the theory of vertical markets is 
invoked here to identify the motivations that leads biotechnology firms specifically to 
transnational vertical investment and other vertical tie-in strategies. 
Industrial organization theory is sufficiently developed to identify economic 
incentives for a firm to vertically integrate under specified competitive, technological, 
and institutional conditions. It provides a somewhat less definitive understanding 
regarding the motivation for contractual vertical ties, but can generate insight into 
conditions under which these may be viable strategies. 
Theoretically, the most definitive motivations for a firm to engage vertical ties 
are evident in the presence of some degree of monopolistic market power, i.e. when 
firms can influence price through decisions regarding quantity sold. Firm-specific 
intangible assets convey a degree of such power in that they distinguish the firm's 
product and differentiate it from those of others. Biotechnology, i.e. the production 
of products using a unique bio-engineered system, if patented, treated as a trade secret, 
strongly associated with a specific brand name or trademark, or otherwise uniquely tied 
to a firm, is thus a basis for the presumption of market power. 
Given such conditions, the economic motivation for vertical investments or tie-
ins can be traced out under assumptions of either fixed proportion or variable 
proportions production functions (based on Carlton and Perloff, 1989). The case for 
fixed proportions is presented first since this is a reasonable representation of a 
biotechnology process, e.g. the production of one genetically-engineered tomato 
requires the input of one genetically altered seed. 
Assume that the biotechnology firm is the upstream producer of a unique 
genetically-altered tomato seed; the downstream enterprise is an overseas tomato 
grower that produces the genetically-engineered product for a specific and 
differentiated end-user market, e.g. a 15-day "flavor-fresh" tomato. Both firms, as sole 
suppliers of "flavor-fresh" seed and tomatoes, have a degree of downstream market 
power. Also assume that the upstream firm, as the originator of this specific 
biotechnology, seeks to maximize profits from the sale of the bioengineered product 
in the end-use market. 
The motivation for vertical integration stems from the successive stages of 
market power. This is most easily illustrated by the case of non-integrated successive 
monopolies, or double marginalization. The marginal revenue curve for a downstream 
monopolist becomes the inverse demand function for its upstream supplier. Thus, the 
downstream monopoly rotates the demand function faced by the upstream supplier 
downward from its point of axis in the vertical dimension, i.e. the downstream firm's 
demand function for the genetically-engineered tomato seed is half what it would be 
if the downstream industry were perfectly competitive. Because the upstream supplier 
also is a monopolist, it determines profit maximizing output on the basis of the revenue 
function that is marginal to this downward-rotated demand function. Thus, total output 
in the end-use market is progressively reduced by monopoly at both vertical stages, i.e. 
marginalization is doubled, reducing output at each stage by half from its perfectly 
competitive level. 
Vertical integration preserves the final market monopoly but eliminates the 
successive upstream monopoly, thus eliminating the double marginalization. This 
increases both total output and total profits. 
Now suppose the assumption of fixed proportions is relaxed. Assume that the 
genetically-altered tomato seed can be combined in varying proportions with fertilizer 
to produce a varying number of genetically-engineered tomatoes, i.e. tomato production 
can be increased by increasing the use of either seed or fertilizer. Fertilizer is supplied 
by a perfectly competitive industry; "flavor-fresh" seed by the monopolist. 
In this case, the motivation for the biotechnology firm to vertically integrate 
rests with potential gains in profits from elimination of monopoly price distortion in 
factor use. The basic intuition is straight forward. Because of the monopoly price for 
seed, the grower uses relatively more of the competitively priced fertilizer than dictated 
by efficient factor use if both inputs were competitively priced at marginal cost. 
Quantity sold and total profits are both lower than if the inputs were used in their most 
efficient ratio, due to the production-reducing impact of the lower quantity and higher 
priced seed on the downstream grower. 
Given this situation, the case for downstream integration by the monopolist 
supplier is apparent. By acquiring the grower enterprise, seed can be supplied at 
marginal cost and combined with fertilizer in the most efficient proportions, thus 
eliminating the factor use inefficiency. The integrated monopolist captures the 
efficiency gain in the form of profits generated in the downstream market. The 
supplier's profits increase by the extent to which efficiency gains exceed the cost of 
integration. 
Three types of vertical restraints or contracts have been shown theoretically to 
induce the same results as vertical integration in the successive monopoly case. These 
are contracts between the upstream and downstream enterprises that (1) set a 
maximum resale price, (2) impose minimum resale quantity quotas, and (3) provide for 
franchise fees. The first is used by the upstream monopolist to force the downstream 
firm to set a competitive resale price; the second is used to force a competitive 
quantity into the end-use market; the third is used to transfer, at least partially, the 
downstream monopoly profits to the upstream firm in return for pricing the upstream 
transaction at marginal cost. 
8. Conclusions and Implications 
Biotechnology will be an expanding influence on global food and agricultural 
production in the future. International intellectual property rights protection is quite 
well-developed, although transgenic animal property rights protection is not at this 
time. An economic feature of many biotechnology advances is that they are intangible 
assets specific to the firm holding the intellectual property rights to the products or 
processes. 
Tighter vertical coordination in agricultural commodity marketing channels and 
in food processing/ distribution channels is anticipated as a consequence of 
commercializing biotechnological advances. Cognizance of the economic determinants 
of enhanced horizontal or vertical ties is important for understanding the complex 
transnational patterns likely to develop around the commercialization of biotechnology. 
The analysis here focuses on the relationships among firm-specific intangJ."ble assets, 
market power, and transnational vertical integration. 
Much empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that as a firm's intang1"ble 
assets increase so will its foreign investment. However, the empirical evidence does 
not discriminate between the horizontal or vertical nature of the amplified FDI. 
Nevertheless, industrial organization theory may be invoked to generate insight into 
conditions under which vertical integration may be encouraged. Firm-specific 
intang1"ble assets are synonymous with some degree of monopoly power by a firm. 
Integration or other vertical restraints between upstream and downstream firms are 
motivated through double marginalization. Downstream integration by a monopolist 
supplier permits supplying the input at marginal cost and eliminating otherwise 
inefficient factor use. The implication of this analysis is that biotechnological advances 
can be expected to lead to tighter vertical coordination in marketing and enhanced 
vertical FDI. 
Table 1. Intangible assets as a proportion of total assets, selected finns 
involved with agricultural and food biotechnology 
Country/Firm Percent (Year) 
United States 
American Cyanamid 8.2 (1990) 
Cal gene 17.7 (1991) 
Cetus Corporation 8.0 (1991) 
DeK.alb Genetics 17.3 (1991) 
DuPont 85 (1991) 
Eli Lilly 15.7 (1991) 
Monsanto 20.7 (1991) 
Pioneer 1.9 (1991) 
Upjohn 9.5 (1991) 
Vega Biotechnologies 8.3 (1991) 
Netherlands 
AKZO 0.0 (1990) 
DSM 1.0 (1990) 
Unilever 0.0 (1990) 
United Kingdom 
Cell tech 0.0 (1990) 
Sweden 
Roffman-LaRoche 4.9 (1990) 
Germany 
Bayer 3.3 (1990) 
BASF 3.0 (1991) 
Boehringer Ingelheim 1.9 (1990) 
BoehringerMannhehn 0.3 (1989) 
Hoechst Ag 0.4 (1989) 
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